Report on Present State of CIPHERUNICORN-E Cipher Evaluation (full evaluation)

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CIPHERUNICORN-E

- CIPHERUNICORN-E was presented by NEC Corporation in 1998.
- Symmetric-key block cipher (block length: 64 bits; key length: 128 bits)
- Registered in ISO9979 (1998)
- Continual evaluation cipher from CRYPTREC2000
- Features
 - Feistel structure (16 rounds) + auxiliary functions (inserted every 2 rounds)
 - Round function with dual structure consisting of a *main stream* and a *temporary key generation mechanism*.
 - Round function designed by cipher evaluation support system (NEC proprietary development).

CRYPTREC2000 evaluation results

• So far, no security-related problems have been discovered.

- In general terms, given that the specification has 16 rounds, it would seem impossible to cryptanalyze the cipher using current theoretical cryptanalysis techniques.
- In terms of processing speed, CIPHERUNICORN-E is classified as a slow group among 64-bit block ciphers
 - Among the 64-bit block ciphers which are in CRYPTREC2000 continual evaluation, this cipher belongs to the slow group. (Speed is approximately 3/5 that of Triple DES in a PC environment.)
- Because this cipher is a complex round function, accurate evaluation is difficult, so continual evaluation is considered necessary.
 - It is difficult to accurately evaluate and analyze security against theoretical cryptanalysis techniques such as differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis.
 - It is necessary to conduct a more-detailed evaluation, replacing the (simplified) mF function with the actual round function.

Evaluation procedure

- Continual evaluation this fiscal year:
 - We requested four specialists (teams) in cipher research in Japan and abroad to conduct a security evaluation based on the following perspectives:
 - Security against *differential cryptanalysis*, from the perspective of differential characteristic probability
 - Security against *linear cryptanalysis*, from the perspective of linear characteristic probability
 - Appropriateness of conducting evaluation using mF function
 - Other noted security-related issues

Overview of security evaluation

Block length: 64 bits Key length: 128 bits



- It is difficult to imagine that CIPHERUNICORN-E, with 16 rounds, could be attacked by differential cryptanalysis or linear cryptanalysis.
 - Security against differential cryptanalysis
 - Upper bound of maximum characteristic probability for round function: $\leq 2^{-21}$

(Upper bound of maximum characteristic probability for 13 rounds: $\leq 2^{-126}$)

- Conclusion: CIPHERUNICORN-E with 16-round specifications cannot be cryptanalyzed by differential cryptanalysis.
- Security against linear cryptanalysis
 - The cipher seems more secure against linear cryptanalysis than against differential cryptanalysis.
 - Upper bound of characteristic probability for round function: $\leq 2^{-24.64}$ (Upper bound of maximum characteristic probability for 13 rounds: $\leq 2^{-147.84}$)
 - Conclusion: CIPHERUNICORN-E with 16-round specifications cannot be cryptanalyzed by linear cryptanalysis.

- I found no grounds for suspecting any problems related to security against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis.
 - Security against differential cryptanalysis
 - My calculated results differed from the evaluation results in the selfevaluation
 - (upper bound of characteristic probability with mF function: $\leq 2^{-72.0}$)
 - However, at present it seems impossible to attack the cipher with differential cryptanalysis.
 - Security against linear cryptanalysis
 - My calculated results differed from the evaluation results in the selfevaluation

(upper bound of characteristic probability with mF function : $\leq 2^{-62.0}$)

• However, at present it seems impossible to attack the cipher with linear cryptanalysis.

- Differential cryptanalysis: My evaluation results differed from the results in the self-evaluation, but I see no problem in terms of security.
 - I calculated an upper bound value different from the value in the self-evaluation for the differential characteristic probability.
 - Upper bound for maximum characteristic probability with mF function: $\leq 2^{-14}$
 - Upper bound for characteristic probability with 15 rounds: $\leq 2^{-98}$
 - Given that CIPHERUNICORN-E has 16 rounds, it seems secure against differential cryptanalysis.
- Linear cryptanalysis: My evaluation results differed from the results in the self-evaluation, but I see no problem in terms of security.
 - I calculated an upper bound value different from the value in the self-evaluation for the linear characteristic probability.
 - Upper bound for maximum characteristic probability with mF function: $\leq 2^{-27.309}$
 - Upper bound for maximum characteristic probability with 15 rounds: $\leq 2^{-191.163}$
 - Given that CIPHERUNICORN-E has 16 rounds, it seems secure against linear cryptanalysis.

- I evaluated whether the 16-round CIPHERUNICORN-E can be attacked by differential cryptanalysis or linear cryptanalysis.
 - Differential cryptanalysis: I believe 16 rounds cannot be attacked.
 - Upper bound for characteristic probability of round function: $\leq 2^{-16}$
 - This does not contradict the results in the self-evaluation, in terms of evaluation based on an upper bound value.
 - I believe that there are no effective differential characteristics for 10 rounds or more.
 - Linear cryptanalysis: I believe 16 rounds cannot be attacked.
 - Upper bound for characteristic probability of round function: $\leq 2^{-16}$
 - I believe the upper bound value (2^{-63.90}) for the round function in the self-evaluation is not appropriate. However, this does not change the conclusion that 16 rounds cannot be attacked.
 - I believe that there are no effective linear characteristics for 10 rounds or more.

Conclusion

- Based on this fiscal year's follow-up evaluation results, so far no security-related problems have been discovered in CIPHERUNICORN-E with 16 rounds, which is the number of rounds in the specifications.
 - The evaluators obtained evaluation results (upper bound values in all cases) that differed from the evaluation results in the self-evaluation, with respect to the evaluation of the round function's differential/linear characteristic probability, etc. However, in no case was there an indication that the number of rounds in the specifications (16 rounds) could be attacked.